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Abstract: 
The rise of the Welfare State after the Second World War has increased the importance of 
analyzing the welfare impact of economic and social policies. Despite taxation is one of the 
most important economic instruments in hands of the governments, the direct effect on 
welfare has not yet received attention. The difficulties in measuring welfare probably explains 
the gap existing in the literature. This work contributes to estimating the effect of tax level 
and tax structure on welfare in European countries over 2004-2014, trough panel data 
models. Besides, countries are grouped by Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean 
and Eastern European models to further evaluate this relationship. Results suggest that fiscal 
pressure increases help countries improve welfare conditions, being labor taxes the ones with 
the largest effects. However, differences in such effects between social models imply that 
these results need to take country-specific particularities into account for adequate policy 
design. 
 
Key Words: Abbreviated welfare functions, Human Development Index, fiscal pressure, tax 
structure, panel data models.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the Welfare State after the Second World War has increased the importance of 
analyzing the welfare impact of economic and social policies. Particularly, after the difficulties 
experienced in the last years, efficiency considerations in the provision of public resources 
have taken special interest. Among the various ways governments affect welfare levels, 
taxation is considered as one of the most relevant economic instruments, Akay et al. (2012). 
However, as mentioned by the authors, so far, the direct effect of taxation on well-being has 
not yet received attention.  
The review of previous literature shows that taxation studies have mainly focus on the impact 
on economic growth and income redistribution. One possible reasons attached is that 
traditionally welfare measures have mainly taken income aspects into consideration. 
However, today it is widely accepted that welfare englobes a broader definition, Jones and 
Klenow (2016). Thus, the idea that wellbeing is inherently multidimensional has by now 
become well established in the academic and policy-oriented literature, Decancq and Lugo 
(2013). Despite there is not a single way to measure welfare, the ideas provided by Amartya 
Sen by the Capability Approach have contributed to the elaboration of several welfare 
indicators beyond GDP: Abbreviated functions of well-being (Sheshinkski, 1972; Runciman, 1966; 
Layard, 1980), the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program, 1990), 
and the Better Life Index (OECD, 2011).  
The objective of this work is to contribute to filling the gap existing in the literature by the 
study of the direct effect of taxation on welfare. For that purpose, a panel data model of 30 
European countries over the period 2004-2014 is analyzed. This way, it is first evaluated the 
effect that taxation level (measured by the fiscal pressure) has over welfare conditions in 
these countries. Then, the welfare differences observed by different tax structures (share of 
labor, capital and consumption taxes over total taxes) are observed. Finally, countries are 
categorized into groups by typologies of social models. This helps to explain the results 
obtained in more detail, providing a narrower picture of the way tax conditions affect welfare 
levels among the selected countries.  
This analysis contributes to filling the gap that exists in the literature, since other aspects than 
income are considered. Only few papers have studied the effect of taxation on welfare, 
mainly considering subjective well-being (SWB) as a measure of welfare. However, in this paper 
other proxies for welfare are provided: Sheshinski’s abbreviated function of welfare and the United 
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Nations Organization’s Human Development Index. This helps to check the robustness of the 
results previously observed. 
The results obtained claim that there exists a positive significant effect of increases in fiscal 
pressure on welfare, when measured by the HDI. Moreover, it is observed that labor taxes 
are the ones affecting the most HDI, followed by capital and consumption taxes. In fact, all 
these effects are significant. The analysis through Sheshinski’s abbreviated welfare function does 
not provide significant results. When decomposed, though, it looks that the reason is 
explained by the effect of taxation level on the GDP per capita (which is not significant), but 
not by the reduction in income inequality (which is significant). In any case, these results are 
consistent with those obtained through the alternative welfare measure (HDI). Finally, it is 
concluded that there are significant welfare differences when countries are grouped into 
typologies of social models (Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean and Easter-
European countries). Hence, a last comment is devoted to providing an overview of welfare 
and taxation conditions within these groups, as well as evaluating the relationship between 
tax structure and welfare in each social model.  
The analysis is structured in seven sections. This first section provides an introduction of the 
analysis to be carried out. The second section mentions previous literature on both welfare 
measures and taxation effects over different dimensions that indirectly affect welfare 
conditions. For that purpose, the evolution of welfare measures is explained, and the way 
taxation affects it through economic growth, income redistribution, provision of public 
goods and tax moral are mentioned. The third section puts welfare and taxation aspects into 
context by providing a picture of different European countries’ situation. The fourth section 
describes the data sources used for the study, while the fifth section comments the empirical 
analysis evaluated. The sixth section presents the results obtained, and in the last section a 
conclusion of the analysis is provided.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Social Welfare: Concept and Measurement 
Since the rise of the Welfare State after the World War II the importance of analyzing the 
welfare impact of economic and social policies has increased. Welfare economics has made 
use of micro-economic foundations to capture the impact of such policies on the level of 
individual and social welfare, Wiebke et al. (2004). As stated by the authors, individual welfare 
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has historically been represented by the utility, which was understood as the desire fulfilment 
or preference satisfaction. In fact, they explain that utility has been routinely measured by 
monetary variables. This tradition has been dominant for the last two centuries, and it has 
been named Welfarism. In that vein, social welfare was understood as an aggregator of the 
individual welfare by means of an aggregator function which could be interpreted as a social 
welfare function, Wiebke et al (2004). However, they note that in recent decades several 
important departures from welfarism have been made, by including non-utility information 
in the evaluation of individual welfare.  
While welfare is highly correlated with GDP per capita, deviations are often large, and it is 
this way how social welfare has been mostly measured, Jones and Klenow (2016). They claim 
that GDP is a flawed measure of economic welfare, though. Leisure, inequality, mortality, 
morbidity, crime and the natural environmental are just some of the major factors affecting 
living standards within a country that are incorporated imperfectly, if at all, in GDP, Jones 
and Klenow (2016). Hence, social welfare englobes, today, a broader definition. Midgley 
(1997) defines this concept as the state or condition of human well-being that exists when 
social problems are managed, when human needs are met, and when social opportunities are 
maximized. However, there is not still clear answer about how social welfare should be 
measured. 
In any case, the idea that wellbeing is inherently multidimensional has by now become well 
established in the academic and policy-oriented literature, Decancq and Lugo (2013). 
However, there are many impediments to accurately measuring social conditions: there are 
problems with the accuracy of the data as well as difficulties in deciding which data should 
be used. In addition, there are disagreements among social scientists about the different 
methodologies that can be employed to study social well-being. While some believe that 
statistical information collected by governments is the most useful source of information, 
others claim that social surveys are more reliable. In general terms, though, social indicators 
are widely regarded as an effective means of quantifying and measuring global social 
conditions today, Midgley (1997).  
The first attempt to measuring welfare beyond non-monetary variables was carried out by 
Amartya Sen through the capability approach. As explained by Kuklys and Robeyns (2004), the 
capability approach is an evaluative framework for individual welfare and social states. The core 
concepts are functionings and capabilities. Sen defined functionings and capabilities as 
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follows: "The primitive notion in the approach is that of functioning — seen as constitutive 
elements of living. A functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to 
do or to be, and any such functioning reflects, as it were, a part of the state of that person 
(outcomes). The capability of a person is a derived notion. It reflects the various 
combinations of functionings (doings and beings) he or she can achieve. It takes a certain 
view of living as combinations of various ‘doings and beings’. Capability reflects a person’s 
freedom to choose between different ways of living (opportunities), Sen (2003). The 
implication behind this rational was that welfare levels measured in terms of functionings 
differed significantly from those measured in terms of income or expenditure. Rankings of 
welfare levels of countries and regions were different when they were performed according 
to standard welfare economics or the capability approach. Therefore, complementary insights 
could be provided by measuring welfare in terms of functionings.  
Based on Amartya Sen’s ideas the United Nations Organization developed the first Human 
Development Report in 1990, Herrero et al. (2018). As they explain, the idea was to go further 
on the way to measure welfare by adding variables other than pure economic ones. Hence, 
they created an index (Human Development Index) which combined material wellbeing (GDP 
per capita), health (life expectancy at birth) and education (literacy and enrollment) 
dimensions.  
In 2009, Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi published a report where they suggested improvements in 
development, welfare and progress measurement. The Stiglitz Commission Report (Stiglitz, et 
al., 2009) was the latest attempt to sort through the criticisms of GDP and seek practical 
recommendations for improvement, Jones and Klenow (2016). The authors write: “To 
define what wellbeing means, a multidimensional definition has to be used. Based on 
academic research and a number of concrete initiatives developed around the world, the 
Commission has identified the following key dimensions that should be taken into account. 
At least in principle, these dimensions should be considered simultaneously: (i) Material 
living standards (income, consumption and wealth); (ii) Health; (iii) Education; (iv) Personal 
activities including work; (v) Political voice and governance; (vi) Social connections and 
relationships; (vii) Environment (present and future conditions); (viii) Insecurity, of an 
economic as well as a physical nature. All these dimensions shape people’s wellbeing, and yet 
many of them are missed by conventional income measures”. The European Commission 
took part in such initiative to go Beyond GDP. Since then, Member States need to elaborate 
statistics which are necessary for the construction of a life quality multidimensional indicator. 
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With respect to the Human Development Index, the OCDE also incorporated important 
changes by considering distributional and descriptive changes. Apart from that, it is especially 
interesting to mention the Better Life Initiative developed by the OCDE in 2011. It constructs 
a table of welfare indicators which take current material and life quality aspects, as well as 
future possibilities into account. In this case, dimensions are not aggregated. Instead, the 
relative importance of each dimension can be selected in order to construct customized 
indexes. These are the variables selected to measure the following dimensions: income and 
wealth (household net adjusted disposable income, household net financial wealth), labor 
conditions (long-term unemployment rate, employment rate, labor market insecurity, 
personal earnings), housing (dwellings without basic facilities, housing expenditure), health 
(self-reported health, life expectancy), work-life balance (employees working very long hours, 
time devoted to leisure and personal care), education (student skills, years in education), 
social connections (quality of support network), civil commitment (voter turnout, 
stakeholder engagement for developing regulations), environment (air pollution, water 
quality), safety (feeling safe walking alone at night, homicide rate), satisfaction (life 
satisfaction).   
As for the use of the empirical analyses, abbreviated functions of well-being have been widely 
used. Sheshinkski (1972) constructed a function combining average income and inequality 
(expressed throughout the Gini coefficient) by a welfare function 𝑊(𝜇, 𝐺) = 𝜇(1 − 𝐺). 
Then, Runciman (1966) and Layard (1980) developed further that function by considering a 
parameter reflecting the aversion to inequality 𝑊(𝜇, 𝐺) = 𝜇(1 − 𝑘𝐺) . This parameter 
would take the value 𝑘 = 0 if inequality had no effect on welfare, and 𝑘 = 1 in case equity 
aspects are equally valued as efficiency considerations.  
2.2 State role in welfare provision: fiscal systems 
As stated by Akay et al. (2012), “Taxation is the main economic instrument in the hand of 
governments influencing individual budget constraints and therefore well-being. Given that 
the effect of income on subjective well-being (SWB) is presently one of the most important 
questions (see Clark, et al., 2008, for a survey) in the SWB literature, it is surprising that there 
is no direct evidence for the effect of taxes on SWB. Accepting that income increases SWB, 
at least in cross-sectional analyses, implies that taxation should reduce it. Clearly, this effect 
is implicitly accounted for in the existing literature, as income net of taxes is systematically 
used in SWB regressions. However, so far, the direct effect of taxation on well-being has not 
yet received attention (an exception is Lubian and Zarri, 2011, who look at the specific 
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relationship between tax moral and SWB). Analyzing the relationship between taxation and 
SWB – in comparison to net income – not only contributes to the literature on the role of 
income for SWB, but especially provides a new perspective on a core question in the 
traditional literature in public and welfare economics: how do tax affect individual well-
being? This is important for both the political economy of tax policy (support for tax 
reforms) and the sustainability and efficiency of public finance (for instance through the level 
of tax compliance)”.  
These authors (2012) found a significant and positive effect of tax payments on well-being, 
conditional on net income. However, the study of the effect of taxes on well-being should 
be carefully carried out. On the one hand, taxes help to finance institutions, public goods 
and services, reduce inequality. However, they also imply costs to the private sectors, since 
they reduce disposable income and generate distortions in their decisions, Boscá et al. (2017). 
The authors claim that there are two aspects to consider when analyzing fiscal systems: tax 
level and tax structure. The first refers to fiscal pressure, which is defined as the proportion 
of tax revenues to GDP. In their study, they explained that insufficient levels of taxation 
levels (hence, making it difficult to finance the adequate provision of public goods and 
services) can be as harmful as an excessive taxation on welfare, which would distort income, 
consumption and employment levels. Fiscal structure, on the other hand, is often studied 
through the study of direct and indirect taxes.  
In this vein, there are several channels through which taxation may be affecting welfare 
conditions within countries. Whichever results are obtained by the empirical analysis, the 
review of previous literature on factors contributing to this effect provides several insights 
which are interesting to mention:  
First and foremost, the tax effect on economic growth deserves to be explained. The relation 
of economic growth and tax levels has not a clear answer. Barro (1990, 1991) was the first 
author who introduced fiscal variables in growth equations for developed countries. It found 
a negative relationship, as well as Koester and Karmendi (1989) did. However, the analysis 
performed by other authors in more recent years (Easterly and Robelo, 1993; Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Folster and Henrelson, 2001) did not find a significant effect. In contrast, the 
fiscal structure provides more interesting insights. Kneller et al. (1999) observed that taxes 
over property had a negative effect over economic growth, whereas the effect of 
consumption taxes was ambiguous. In this line, Johansson et al. (2008) showed that corporate 
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taxes were the ones reducing more economic growth, followed by labor taxes. Consumption 
taxes, and property taxes were the least harmful ones. This result was also concluded by a 
report dealt by the OCDE (2010).  
Regarding tax effects on the provision of public goods and services, several authors (Frey et 
al., 2009; Luechinger, 2009; Luechinger and Raschky, 2009; Levinson, 2012) claim that the 
under provision of public goods (and as a consequence the prevalence of terrorism, pollution 
or flood disasters) has a negative effect on SWB. In this line, Boscá et al. (2013) found that 
the substitution of social security contributions by indirect taxes has positive effects over 
public revenues, as well as employment and GDP.  
Others have studied the relation of taxes with redistribution and insurance through the social 
security system, Alesina et al. (2004). Akay et. al (2012) explained redistribution in two ways: 
high solidarity or strong belief in the role of the state, or the wiliness to have a tight social 
security net due to risk aversion (e.g. unemployment shock). Oishi et al. (2012) found a 
positive effect of a fair distribution of wealth increases over a nation’s well-being. In fact, the 
authors stated that progressivity of the tax system increases a nation’s SWB. Di Tella et al. 
(2003) concluded that higher unemployment benefits are associated with higher national 
well-being. Alesina et al. (2004) highlighted that inequality has a negative effect on SWB, 
especially in Europe. An article by Kyriacou et al. (2017) highlighted the importance of 
redistributive efficiency of fiscal policies due to increasing inequality (IMF, 2014; OECD, 
2008, 2011) and scare budget resources that characterize recent years. They claim that 
efficiency allows the attainment of a given level of redistribution at lower levels of spending 
and taxes or the attainment of more redistribution at given tax and spending levels. In an 
article by Iosifidi and Mylonidis (2016) the contribution of tax structures (in terms of labor, 
capital and consumption taxes) to inequality is mentioned. They stated that only labor 
taxation exerts a significant negative effect on inequality. Hence, increasing the tax burden 
on labor relative to capital leads to higher income inequality. Similarly, rising the ratio of 
consumption to capital taxes inequality rises. Indeed, they concluded that income inequality 
decreases more in economically developed, institutionally stronger countries that have less 
labor to consumption taxes, IMF (2014). 
Additionally to that, the effect of taxes and tax moral (the moral obligation to pay taxes) has 
also been studied. Lubian and Zarri (2011) claimed that cheating (tax evasion and aversion) 
generates lower levels of well-being than fiscal honesty. Frey and Stutzen (2001) explained 
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that more intensive participation in a democracy through political institutions is associated 
with a higher SWB, in the sense of a higher citizenship belonging of belonging to the society.  
3 WELFARE AND TAX CONTEXT: 
In this part, a brief summary of current social and fiscal conditions in European countries is 
provided. The nation state is today used as the basic unit for analysis in economics, Midgley 
(1997). It functions as the unit at which social welfare issues are analyzed and social policies 
are formulated and implemented. Therefore, this section collects relevant data on welfare 
and taxation issues in order to provide a picture of trends and current conditions among 
European countries.  
3.1 Welfare Conditions: 
As explained in previous sections, welfare conditions have traditionally been explained by 
the income levels countries had. Figure 1 below, provided by the World Bank (2018), shows 
a map of the GDP per capita (constant 2010). As for the last available year (2016), the country 
with the highest value of the GDP per capita (constant 2010) is Luxembourg (108,600.935 
thousands), followed by Norway (90,288.8224 thousands), Ireland (69.974,11309 thousands), 
and Denmark (60,670.2 thousands). The lowest values correspond to Bulgaria (7,967.7 
thousands), Romania (10,065.5 thousands), Croatia (14,452.1 thousands), Latvia (14,724.7 
thousands), and Hungary (14,997.2 thousands). The standard deviation of these data, which 
refers to the variability of the GDP per capita, equals 23,991.5826 thousand constant 2010 
dollars.  
Figure 1: GDP per capita (constant 2010 thousand dollars) in 2016. 
 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data Files 
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With the purpose of having a broader picture of welfare conditions among European 
countries, latest available data on the Human Development Index is presented. The United 
Nations Organization (2018) considers all countries of study with very high human 
development 𝐻𝐷𝐼 [0.8 − 1] , except Bulgaria which is described as high human 
development, 𝐻𝐷𝐼 [0.7 − 0.8]. This way, in 2015 (latest available data) it is observed that 
Norway (HDI=0.949) is the country with the highest welfare level. It is followed by Germany 
(HDI=0.926), Denmark (HDI=0.925), the Netherlands (HDI=0.925) and Ireland 
(HDI=0.924). Among the countries with the least welfare conditions are: Bulgaria 
(HDI=0.794), Romania (HDI=0.802), Croatia (HDI=0.827), Latvia (HDI=0.83) and 
Hungary (HDI=0.836). The standard deviation of the Human Development Index among the 
selection of the aforementioned European countries (2015) is 0.039 units.  
Figure 2: Human Development Index in European countries, 2015 
 
Source: United Nations Development Program. Human Development Reports. Data (2018). Own Elaboration 
 
As explained in a report carried out by the OECD (2017), the figure below shows that 
“countries above the blue diagonal line generally perform better on quality-of-life outcomes, 
relative to material conditions; the converse is true for those below the diagonal. Finland and 
Denmark, for example, have very high scores on quality of life, relative to their mid-ranking 
position on material conditions. By contrast, the United States, Australia, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and Germany have a high number of comparative strengths on material 
conditions, compared to their relative position on quality of life indicators. Nevertheless, the 
top left and bottom right quadrants of the figure are sparsely populated: no OECD country 
does well on quality of life without achieving a moderate level of material conditions, and 
vice versa”.  
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Figure 3: Comparative performance on material conditions (x-axis) and quality of life (y-axis) OECD 
countries, latest available data 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
3.2 Tax Level: 
In a report published in 2017, the European Commission explained that, in general, the EU 
tax level is high compared to other advanced economies: around 12 percentage points of 
GDP above the level for the USA and 7 percentage points above the recorded by Japan (in 
2014). It is also significantly higher than the level for New Zealand (32,8%), Canada (31,9%), 
Australia (27,8% in 2014) and South Korea (25,3%).  
Figure 4: Tax revenue (including social contributions), EU and selected countries, 2015 (% of GDP). 
 
Source: DG taxation and Customs Union, based on Eurostat and OECD data, European Commission (2017) 
Selected data for the 30 European countries that are furthered studied from section IV on, 
latest available data show that Iceland (51.6%), Denmark (46.4%), France (45.6%), Belgium 
(44.4%), Finland (44.1%) experience the highest fiscal pressure. Ireland (23.3%), Romania 
(25.9%), Bulgaria (29.0%), Lithuania (29.8%), and Latvia (31.2%). Taking this data into 
account, the standard deviation shows the variation in the taxation level among these 
countries in 2016, which was 6.38%.  
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Figure 5: Tax level: Fiscal pressure in European countries, 2016 
 
Source: European Commission. Data on Taxation. Indicators (2018). Own Elaboration. 
3.3 Tax Structure 
A more detailed view of this data is analyzed by decomposing the taxation level by the way 
it is structured. The European Commission (2017) explains that the structure of taxation 
varies quite significantly across Member States of the EU. When it comes to the share of 
direct taxes in total tax revenues, in 2016, Iceland has the highest share (66.0%) followed by 
Denmark (65.1%), Ireland (46.0%), Malta (43.2%), United Kingdom (42.6%), as well as 
Sweden (42.6%) and Norway (40.4%). In general, the shares of social contributions to total 
tax revenues are correspondingly low in these countries. In Denmark, there is a special reason 
for the extremely low share of social contributions: most welfare spending is financed out of 
general taxation. This requires high direct taxation levels and indeed the share of direct 
taxation to total tax revenues in Denmark is by far the highest in the Union. However, 
Germany, the Netherlands and France have tax systems that are the mirror image of 
Denmark’s with high shares of social contributions in the total tax revenues, and relatively 
low shares of direct tax revenues.  
A number of Member States have a much lower share of direct taxes. Many of these countries 
have adopted a flat rate system, which typically induce a stronger reduction in direct tax rates 
than indirect tax rates. These lower shares of direct taxes are counterbalanced either by 
relatively higher proportions of indirect taxes (for example Bulgaria (53.6%), Croatia (51.7%) 
and Hungary (46.6%) or by relatively larger shares of social contributions (for example 
Slovakia (43.8%), Czech Republic (42.3%) and Lithuania (40.9%)).  
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Figure 6: Tax structure: direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions in European 
countries, 2016 
 
Source: European Commission. Data on Taxation Indicators (2018). Own Elaboration 
Figure 7: Tax structure: labor, capital and consumption taxes in European countries, 2016 
 
Source: European Commission. Data on Taxation. Indicators (2018). Own Elaboration 
The interest, here, relies on analyzing whether there exists any relationship between both tax 
levels and structures, and welfare conditions in different countries. The descriptive analysis 
provided seem to project a positive relationship since the highest welfare performers in the 
Human Development Index are those with the highest tax level. However, this statement needs 
to be furthered studied in order to reach a reliable conclusion. Besides, in case there exists 
any relationship, a further analysis on the way fiscal pressure is structured will provide 
complementary insights.  
4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
This section explains in detail the data which is later on used for the empirical model which 
analyses the effect of taxation on welfare. As mentioned in section II, welfare can be 
represented by the abbreviated welfare function of Sheshinkski, which is constructed from the 
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GDP per capita and Gini Coefficient data, both obtained from The World Bank national 
accounts (2018). As defined by the institution, GDP per capita is elaborated with the gross 
domestic product (the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products) 
divided by midyear population. It is measured in constant 2010 US$, which allows to control 
for price variations over time. As stated by The World Bank (2018), “Gini index measures 
the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received 
against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or 
household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical 
line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus 
a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
Such data developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank are based on 
primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World 
Bank country departments”.  
Additionally, as a way to have an alternative measure for welfare, the model is also estimated 
through the Human Development Index elaborated by the United Nations Organization (2018). 
As explained by the United Nations Organization, the HDI was created to emphasize that 
people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of 
a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy 
choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with 
different human development outcomes. These contrast can stimulate debate about 
government policy priorities. Hence, The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the 
geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The health 
dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by 
mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling 
for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross 
national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing 
importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices 
are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean. The United Nations 
Organization mentions that the HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human 
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development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, 
empowerment, etc.  
Data on taxation comes from the European Commission (2018), which publishes an 
overview of trends in taxation revenues, tax structures and reforms over recent years (2004-
2016) aiming to develop robust and effective tax policies for the future. Regarding the 
taxation level, the European Commission provides data on the total tax revenue (including 
social contributions) over GDP; this is, fiscal pressure.  
In relation to tax structures, there is also a great variety of data provided by the European 
Commission. In the Annex B (Methodology and explanatory notes) of “Taxation trends in 
the European Union”, the European Commission explains that, traditionally, taxes have 
been decomposed by direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes tax endowment increases, 
whereas indirect taxes are applied to consumption - which is considered as the ability to pay. 
Hence, total taxes include taxes (direct and indirect taxes) plus compulsory actual social 
contributions. Indirect taxes include taxes on consumption (value added taxes, taxes and 
duties on imports excluding VAT, taxes on products except VAT and import duties such as 
taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and environmental taxes -energy, transport, pollution and 
resources taxes-). Direct taxes include labor taxes (personal income tax, employees’ social 
security contributions, employers’ social security contributions) and capital taxes (corporate 
income tax). This data is commonly expressed as a fraction over total taxes in each case.  
Hence, data obtained on taxation from the European Commission (2018) note that the sum 
of all direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social contributions add up total taxes. On the other 
hand, the methodology and explanatory notes in Annex B, developed by the European 
Commission (2017), explain that total taxes can also be decomposed by labor taxes, 
consumption taxes and capital taxes.  
As for the use of control variables, that may be significant for the welfare analysis, data on 
corruption and unemployment levels are considered. The World Bank (2018) elaborates a 
Control of Corruption variable reflects perceptions of “the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests”, Kaufmann et al. (2010). The authors 
state that “it combines the views of a number of enterprises, citizens and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data sources underlying 
the aggregate indicators are drown form a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, 
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non-governmental organizations and international organizations. The World Bank uses an 
Unobserved Component Model (UCM) to aggregate the various responses in the six clusters 
(Violence and Accountability, Political Stability/ Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and control of Corruption). This model treats 
the “true” level of governance in each country as unobserved, and assumes that each of the 
available sources for a country provide noisy “signals” of the level of governance. The UCM 
then constructs a weighted average of the sources for each country as the best estimate of 
governance for a country. The weights are proportional to the reliability of each source. This 
means that more precise sources (in the sense of providing less noisy signals of governance) 
receive more weight in the aggregate indicators. The resulting estimates of governance have 
an expected value (across countries) of zero, and a standard deviation (across countries) of 
one. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better outcomes”.  
The Long-Run Unemployment Rate is obtained from the OECD (2018). “It refers to people who 
have been unemployed for 12 months or more. The long-term unemployment rate shows 
the proportion of these long-term unemployed among all unemployed. Unemployment is 
usually measured by national labor force surveys and refers to people reporting that they 
have worked in gainful employment for less than one hour in the previous week, who are 
available for work and who have sought employment in the past four weeks. Long-term 
unemployment causes significant mental and material stress for those affected and their 
families. It is also of particular concern for policy makers, as high rates of long-term 
unemployment indicate that labor markets are operating inefficiently. This indicator is 
measured as a percentage of unemployed”. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the selected 30 European countries (2004-2014) 
 Welfare GDP pc Gini HDI FP DT/TT IT/TT SS/TT LT/TT Ca/TT Co/TT 
Mean 10952,05 15670,46 31,02 0,86 35,60 32,14 39,19 28,79 46,42 19,38 34,24 
St. Dev 9314,30 13197,53 4,05 0,04 5,45 10,85 6,66 10,56 7,43 6,51 6,87 
Max. 39317,87 54527,29 39,00 0,95 48,90 68,19 56,11 44,78 61,49 36,76 54,34 
Min. 508,21 799,07 0,00 0,75 25,33 15,74 26,61 0,13 27,14 6,80 21,19 
 
5 ECONOMETRIC MODELS:  
The analysis aims to study of the effect that taxation exerts over welfare levels among 
European countries (2004-2014). For that purpose two different analysis are carried out: 
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First, the impact that the taxation level exerts over countries’ welfare levels is studied. Then, 
the way tax structure affects it is analyzed.  
In order to do so, panel data models are used. The reason for that is that the same countries 
(same sample) are analyzed over the 11 different periods (2004-2014). Because the analysis 
is focused on European countries, all countries for which taxation data is available in the 
European Commission (2018) are selected (N=30): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, and Norway. 
A panel data model has been considered more adequate than a cross-sectional model, since 
the observation of the selected countries in several periods provides a more precise result 
than a one year evaluation. However, panel data models imply that despite observations are 
independent from each other (random sample individuals meaning that error terms are not 
correlated among different observations), they are not identically distributed. This is 
important to bear in mind, because results obtained from pooled data models are not 
appropriate.  
The estimated panel data model considers the usual panel data models’ assumptions, Jeffrey 
(2010): i) Countries are randomly selected, ii) Perfect linear combinations within the 
explanatory variables do not exist and they present changes over time (at least in some of 
them), iii) The estimator is consistent at least when N tends to infinity (the expected value 
of the idiosyncratic error, given the explanatory variables in all years, and the unobservable 
effect is zero: 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑠, 𝛼𝑖) = 0 ), iv) homoscedasticity: 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑠) = 0 , v) the 
explanatory variables are independent and identically and normally distributed. 
Different models are studied with the purpose of checking their robustness. Similar results 
are expected when measurement variations are incorporated in any variable, though. In any 
case, welfare is considered as the dependent variable of the model, and it is measured both 
by the abbreviated welfare function provided by Sheshinski (1972) and the Human Development 
Index performed by the United Nations Organization (2018). As for the explanatory 
variables, the interest of the analysis relies both on taxation level (fiscal pressure) and 
structure (share of labor, capital, and consumption taxes over total taxes). The study of the 
tax structure could also have been carried out through direct and indirect taxes. However, 
the obtained results seem to be misleading because direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
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security contributions corresponding to Belgium do not add up to total taxes. Table 1 below 
summarizes the data used in the two analyses:  
Table 2: Summary of the variables included in the analysis 
Notation: Model: Description Source: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 Dependent variable Abbreviated Welfare Function  Sheshinski (1972) 
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 Dependent variable Human Development Index  United Nations Organization 
(1990) 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 Explanatory 
variable 
Fiscal Pressure European Commission 
(2018) 
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Labor taxes over total taxes European Commission 
(2018) 
𝐶𝑎𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Capital taxes over total taxes  European Commission 
(2018) 
𝐶𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Consumption taxes over total 
taxes  
European Commission 
(2018) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 Control variable Corruption World Bank (2018) 
𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 Control variable Long Run Unemployment  OECD (2018) 
 
As for the error term (𝑢𝑖𝑡), the dimensions provided by the Better Life Index of the OECD 
are considered to be affecting welfare, others than taxation: Income (household net adjusted 
disposable income, household net financial wealth), work-life balance (employees working 
very long hours, time devoted to leisure and personal care), housing (dwellings without basic 
facilities, housing expenditure, rooms per person), jobs (long-term employment rate, 
employment rate, labor market insecurity, personal earnings), social networks (quality of 
support network), education (education attainment, student skills, years in education), 
environment (air pollution, water quality), civic engagement (voter turnout, stakeholder 
engagement for developing regulations), health (self-reported health, life expectancy), life 
satisfaction (life satisfaction), safety (feeling safe walking alone at night, homicide rate).  
Because panel data are used, the individual and temporal effects of the error term are taken 
into account. The individual effect (𝛼𝑖) considers that the error term among individuals 
varies (while time differences in the error term are taken constant). The temporal effect (𝑣𝑡) 
takes error term variations across individuals as constant, while it measures error term 
differences across time. Because the dimensions considered in the error term vary from 
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country to country, while temporal differences are not that different, it is assumed that 
individual effects prevail.    
In order to conclude whether the model of individual effect has to be estimated by fixed or 
random effects the Haussmann test is evaluated. Random effects estimation uses the same 
transformation as fixed effects estimation, but taking into consideration that the term ∝𝑖 is 
not correlated with any of the explanatory variables for any period. This test (directly 
provided by Gretl) tests the null hypothesis that the individual effect ∝𝑖 is independent form 
all the explanatory variables and for any period.  
5.1 Effect of Tax Level and Welfare: 
The first analysis, aims to study the effect of taxation level (measured by fiscal pressure) on 
different welfare measures. Some control variables are added since it is considered that 
there are several components, which can be observed, affecting welfare which differ across 
countries over time and should be controlled in order to obtain a more precise estimate of 
the explanatory variables of interest. Hence, corruption and long-run unemployment levels 
are suggested, and the following general models are presented: 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟏: 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟐: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Additionally to these models, the effect that fiscal pressure exerts over GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 dollar) and the Gini coefficient are analyzed. The reason for that is that in 
case different results are obtained by the two general models, the aforementioned analysis 
could provide helpful explanations. The abbreviated welfare function of welfare is a composition 
of the GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient. Hence, because the taxation level effect 
could be counterbalance by the relationship it has on the GDP per capita and the Gini 
coefficient, these effects are also considered.  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟏. (𝑨): ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟏. (𝑩): ln (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
5.2 Effect of Tax Structure on Welfare: 
On the other hand, a second analysis is performed to see whether tax structure is what 
matters for welfare. This way total taxation is decomposed to conclude whether the effects 
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of the tax structure affects welfare differently. The fact that labor, capital and consumption 
taxes are provided as a ratio over total taxes by the European Commission implies that these 
dummy variables present a multicollinearity problem. Because of that reason, control 
variables are not included. This is the general model of interest: 
 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟑: 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵2
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵3
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟒: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵2
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵3
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The multicollinearity problem can be solved if the estimation does not include one of those 
dummy variables. However, there is an important aspect to be mentioned: The estimators 
obtained cannot be interpreted as the ceteris paribus mean causal effect of the explanatory 
variable under study on welfare (dependent variable). Instead, differences in the effect on 
the dependent variable by each of the dummy variables included over the ones which are not 
included are obtained, as demonstrated below: 
 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟑: 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵2
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵3
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵2
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵3 (1 −
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
−
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
) +∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵3̂ + (𝐵1 − 𝐵3)̂
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ (𝐵2 − 𝐵3)̂
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
+∝𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
5.3 Analysis of the Welfare Differences among Typologies of Social Models: 
As mentioned by Midgley (1997) in the modern world, nations are often grouped into 
categories or subsystems in terms of geographic, cultural, economic, and political criteria. As 
a way to better present the results obtained by this empirical analysis, European nations are 
categorized in groups of similar characteristics in order to provide a deeper understanding 
of the way in which social conditions are affected by the particular characteristics their fiscal 
systems have. This is a powerful tool to narrow down the complex differences between 
countries to a manageable set of dimensions and indicators, Aiginger et al. (2009). In fact, 
future policy can be benefited from a proper understanding of the drivers that have enabled 
some countries performed better than others in the recent past. For that purpose, differences 
between typologies of social models have to be assessed in light of the welfare state 
challenges that lie ahead, Aiginger and Leoni (2009). The aim of this section is to test whether 
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a “typologies of social models” perspective shows significant differences regarding welfare 
conditions, so that it is worth it its evaluation.  
Andersen (1990) states that different welfare state regimes are encountered within the EU. 
These are the ones generally identified (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000) and, therefore, included 
in the model: Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland), Anglo-
Saxon countries (Ireland, United Kingdom), Continental countries (Germany, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Luxemburg), Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain) and Easter European countries (Baltic States, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia).  
According to Aiginger and Leoni (2009), the Scandinavian model is the most comprehensive 
one, with a high degree of emphasis on redistribution, social inclusion and universality. The 
authors explain, that these countries can be subsumed under this ideal-type and they are 
characterized by a strong social dialogue and close cooperation of the social partners with 
the government, with trade unions prominently involved in economic life at large. The 
Continental model emphasizes employment as the basis of social transfers, benefits are at 
more moderate level and are linked to income. The liberal or Anglo-Saxon, emphasizes the 
responsibility of individuals for themselves; social transfers are smaller than in other 
countries, more targeted and means tested. In the Mediterranean model, the low level of 
social transfers is partly counterbalanced by the strong supportive role of family networks. 
As Ferrera (1996) has pointed out, in opposition to the universalistic model of the North, 
social policies in the Southern model are characterized by particularistic and clienteles traits. 
Central and Eastern European countries can represent an own group mode. Their post-war 
history has followed completely distinct path from the rest of Europe, with no need for state 
and society to develop an institutional framework able to absorb the conflicts between capital 
and labor, Keune (2006). In spite of its universalistic drive, the state-socialist model was 
fraught with problems, especially the low quality of services and the dysfunctionalities of the 
planned economy. In the years after 1989, when state-socialism was replaced by the market 
system, all CEE countries experienced a profound crises, and it was only by the mid – 1990s 
that most CEE countries regained stability and started their catching-up process.  
In order to empirically analyze whether there are significant welfare differences among the 
selected European countries, the following model is considered: 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟓: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑑𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑑𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑑𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑑𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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However, because of a multicollinearity problem the effect of each social model is estimated 
one by one. This result will provide an explanation of the difference (and its significance) 
there exist between the estimated social model and the rest of the models. Then, aiming to 
see the differences observed between each of the social model proposed, the same model is 
estimated, but one of the dummy variables is not included in the model.  
Table 3: Summary of the dummy variables included in the analysis 
Notation: Model: Description 
𝑑𝐴𝑖𝑡 Explanatory variable Dummy variable corresponding to Anglo-Saxon countries 
𝑑𝑀𝑖𝑡  Explanatory variable Dummy variable corresponding to Mediterranean countries 
𝑑𝐶𝑖𝑡 Explanatory variable Dummy variable corresponding to Continental countries 
𝑑𝐸𝑖𝑡  Explanatory variable Dummy variable corresponding to Eastern-European countries 
𝑑𝑁𝑖𝑡  Explanatory variable Dummy variable corresponding to Nordic countries 
 
The purpose of the above analysis is to conclude whether the way different social models 
are affected by tax structure deserves to be studied. In such case, a proper analysis to observe 
the way different tax structures affect welfare levels in different countries’ groups would be 
obtained throughout the following model: 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟔. 𝟏: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑈 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟔. 𝟐: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑈 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟔. 𝟑: 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑈 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
The interest of these estimations relies on the interpretation of the sum of the coefficients 
𝛽4 + 𝛽5 since they represent the effect of increasing either labour, capital or consumption 
taxes in one million euros on the Human Development Index of each social model type described 
above. This is because data corresponding to labour, capital and consumption taxes are given 
in million euros by Eurostat (2018). Thanks to having absolute values, instead of shares over 
total taxes, the effect of them on welfare can be estimated. This model takes as a reference 
the model provided by Akai et al. (2012), which evaluates the effect of taxation on subjective 
well-being. They took into account income levels and socio-demographic characteristics and 
used them as control variables in the model. Therefore, the suggested estimation 
incorporates GDP per capita levels, corruption values and long-run unemployment rates as 
control variables of the model. Additionally to that, a dummy variable corresponding to one 
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of the social model typologies aforementioned are included and multiplied by each type of 
tax, to observe the way this effect differs between social models.  
6 RESULTS 
6.1 Tax Level and Welfare: 
The results presented below show that when welfare is measured by the Human Development 
Index, fiscal pressure increases welfare significantly. Indeed, this results holds when control 
variables are included in the model (corruption and long-run unemployment). In fact, the 
estimated effect when control variables are included allow observing the partial effect of 
taxation increases on welfare, which discounts the effect of such control variables. However, 
the analysis of fiscal pressure effect on welfare, measured by Sheshinski’s abbreviated welfare 
function, seem not to be significant. Not even when control variables are added. At least, the 
result is that fiscal pressure has a positive effect on welfare, which is consistent with the 
results obtained with the HDI.  
Further explanations are obtained by decomposing the abbreviated welfare function by GDP per 
capita and the Gini coefficient. Fiscal pressure increases GDP per capita, but the effect is 
not significant. In contrast, it happens that inequality is reduced significantly by higher fiscal 
pressure. Hence, it can be interpreted that there are factors, other than income factors, which 
may explain why welfare increases when fiscal pressure is higher. It is, indeed, observed that 
whenever control variables are added into the model, the coefficient corresponding to the 
abbreviated welfare functions decreases, whereas the HDI one rises.  
Table 4: Effect of fiscal pressure on the Abbreviated Welfare Function 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 
Fiscal Pressure 0.0046 0.0270 0.0129 0.0107 
Corruption  -0.2081**  -0.1357 
LRU   -0.0024* -0.0031* 
n  264 264 243 243 
FE/RE FE (2.7670e-146) FE (1.3116E-146) FE (1.4799e-137) FE (3.3753e-137) 
Note that the coefficients correspond to the ceteris paribus causal effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
The significance level is provided on the right by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (1%). The abbreviated welfare function is included in 
logarithmic terms to mitigate large variations.  
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Table 5: Effect of fiscal pressure on the Human Development Index 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
Fiscal Pressure 0.0010** 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
Corruption  0.0124***  0.0104*** 
LRU   -7.3586 -4.3270e-05 
n  330 319 284 284 
FE/RE RE (8.1166e-05) RE (1.5816e-12) RE (0.0042) RE (4.0224e-08) 
Note that the coefficients correspond to the ceteris paribus causal effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
The significance level is provided on the right by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (1%).  
Table 6: Effect of fiscal pressure on GDP per capita 
 Model 1(A).1 Model 1(A).2 Model 1(A).3 Model 1(A).4 
Fiscal Pressure 0.0041 0.0026 0.0112 0.0092 
Corruption  -0.2246**  -0.1664* 
LRU   -0.0023 -0.0026* 
n  270 270 249 249 
FE/RE FE (8.2511e-151) FE (2.043e-151) FE (2.1714e-14) FE (2.6048e-141) 
Note that the coefficients correspond to the ceteris paribus causal effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
The significance level is provided on the right by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (1%). The GDP per capita is included in logarithmic 
terms to mitigate large variations.  
Table 7: Effect of fiscal pressure on the Gini Coefficient 
 Model 1(B).1 Model 1(B).2 Model 1(B).3 Model 1(B).4 
Fiscal Pressure -0.1566** -0.0995 -0.1589** 0.0590 
Corruption  -1.2743**  -0.0859 
LRU   0.0550*** 0.0523*** 
n  290 290 266 266 
FE/RE RE (0.0004) RE (0.0154) RE (0.0321) RE (1.4750e-36) 
Note that the coefficients correspond to the ceteris paribus causal effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
The significance level is provided on the right by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (1%).  
 
6.2 Tax Structure and Welfare: 
The analysis of the effect of tax structure (the decomposition of total taxes by labor taxes, 
capital taxes and consumption taxes) on welfare offers the following interpretation: 
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Capital taxes are the taxes with the highest effect on welfare, measured by Sheshinkski’s 
abbreviated welfare function, followed by labor taxes. The only significant difference in the effect 
they have on welfare belongs to capital taxes over both labor and consumption taxes, but 
there does not seem to be significant differences in the effect that labor or consumption 
taxes have over welfare, when it is measured by an abbreviated function.  
Table 7: Analysis of the differences in the effects of tax structure on the abbreviated welfare function 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
 -0.0159017 (B1<B2)** 0.00307021 (B1>B3) 
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
0.0158704 (B2>B1)**  0.0189505 (B2>B3)** 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
-0.00311069 (B3<B1) 0.0189505 (B2>B3)**  
Note that this table shows how different is the explanatory variable in the left with respect to the explanatory variable in the 
right, and represented by the coefficient provided in the table. The significance level of such differences regarding the welfare levels 
are expressed as *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (1%). 
 
Table 8: Analysis of the differences in the effects of tax structure on the human development index  
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
 0.000977835 (B1>B2)** 0.00225345 (B1>B3)*** 
𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
-0.00097964 (B2<B1)**  0.00127504 (B2>B3)*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
-0.00225013(B3<B1)*** -0.00127233(B3<B2)***  
Note that this table shows how different is the explanatory variable in the left with respect to the explanatory variable in the 
right, and represented by the coefficient provided in the table. The significance level of such differences regarding the welfare levels 
are expressed as *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (1%). 
 
Alternative measures of welfare (HDI), however, conclude that labor taxes are the ones 
affecting most welfare conditions in European countries, followed by capital and 
consumption taxes, respectively. Besides, all differences are significant. Therefore, it can be 
stated that by taking other dimensions than income and inequality into account, welfare 
conditions are mostly affected by labor taxes, capital and consumption taxes, respectively. 
However, if only income and inequality are observed, capital and labor taxes affect welfare 
the most, respectively; and consumption taxes do not present significant differences on the 
way they affect welfare compared to other taxes. This results show consistent relationships 
compared to previous literature, which finds that capital taxes have the largest (negative) 
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effect on economic growth (the most proximate monetary variable to GDP per capita), and 
as for inequality measures, labor taxes are the ones affecting it negatively (meaning that 
inequality is reduces) and consumption is either ambiguous or positive. Hence, HDI is 
probably capturing better all these effect so a more global view of its effect on welfare.  
6.3 Analysis of the Welfare Differences among Typologies of Social Models: 
The last analysis observes whether it is significant to group different countries in groups of 
Typologies of Social Models to explain the results in more detail. The results show that 
Nordic countries are the ones experiencing the highest welfare differences compared to the 
rest of groups. In fact, they are the countries with the highest welfare. Such differences are 
only significant compared to Mediterranean and Eastern-European countries welfare levels 
(measured by the Human Development Index). Anglo-Saxon countries come to the second place 
regarding welfare levels. In the same vein, only differences with Mediterranean and Eastern-
European countries are significant. In the third position Continental countries are located, 
with significant differences with Mediterranean and Eastern-European countries. 
Mediterranean countries, experience significant welfare differences with all countries, and it 
only lies above Eastern-European countries.  
Table 9: Analysis of the welfare differences by typologies of social models  
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡  Rest dC dE dN dA dM 
dC 0.0384015***  0.0665606*** −0.0156970 −0.0111061 0.0447212*** 
dE -0.05973*** −0.0665606***  −0.08226*** −0.077667***   −0.0218394* 
dN 0.0557018*** 0.0156970   0.0822576***  0.00459091 0.0604182*** 
dA 0.0448149 0.0111061 0.077667 *** −0.00459091  0.0558273***   
dM -0.0168000 −0.0447212*** 0.0218394* −0.06042*** −0.055827***  
Note that this table shows how different is the dummy variable in the left with respect to the dummy variable in the right, and 
represented by the coefficient provided in the table. The significance level of such differences regarding the welfare levels (measured 
by the HDI) are expressed as *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (1%). 
 
Since the suggested groups present significant welfare differences, a brief interpretation is 
provided below. Figure 8 shows the tax level of each European country in 2016 (latest 
available data). It is concluded that both Nordic and Continental countries (in green and blue 
color, respectively) have the highest fiscal pressure. Eastern European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries have the lowest taxation level, and Mediterranean countries present notable 
variations within the group.  
29 
 
Figure 8:  Tax level: fiscal pressure in European countries, 2016 
 
Source: European Commission. Data on Taxation Indicators (2018). Own Elaboration 
Grouping the fiscal pressure of each country by the average in their type of social model, it 
is shown that the trend is mostly constant for the period of study (2004-2016). Nordic 
countries, followed by Continental countries, are the ones presenting the highest taxation 
levels. On the other hand, although in 2004 Anglo-Saxon, Easter-European and 
Mediterranean countries had all low values for tax levels, this trend has presented some 
variations. As for the evolution of the fiscal pressure in Anglo-Saxon countries, figure 9 
shows that they have remained constant, which had lead to become the social model with 
the lowest fiscal pressure. Mediterranean countries have experienced the highest increase 
within these three social models, but still lies below both Nordic and Continental countries. 
Finally, Eastern-European countries have maintained low tax levels, but have experienced a 
slight increase in the last years. 
Figure 9: Tax level: Fiscal pressure evolution by typologies of social models, 2004-2016 
 
Source: European Commission. Data on Taxation. Indicators (2018). Own Elaboration 
 
With such considerations in mind, taxation components (labor, capital and consumption 
taxes) have been studies and its relationship with welfare (measured by the HDI) is provided 
in Tables 8-10. It is observed that considering the effect of GDP per capita, corruption levels 
and long-run unemployment rates, positive effects when all labor, capital and consumption 
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taxes increase in one million euros are observed. In fact, these effects are significant for the 
case of labor and consumption tax rises.  The differences on the effect these taxes have on 
welfare, are represented by the last row in the given tables. It is observed that regarding 
increases in labor taxes, the effect is positive and significant for Nordic and Easter European 
countries. Continental countries also present a positive relationship, but it is not significant. 
In contrast, Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries are worst off in welfare terms, when 
labor taxes are raised. As for increases in capital taxes, it is observed that Continental 
countries’ welfare levels are significantly increases. Nordic countries also present a positive, 
but not significant relationship. Eastern-European countries’ HDI is reduced significantly 
when capital taxes are increased in one million euros. Finally, both Anglo-Saxon and 
Mediterranean countries are worsen by increases in capital taxes, but not significantly. On 
the other hand, consumption taxes show positive and significant results on welfare in the 
case of Nordic and Eastern-European countries. Continental countries present positive, but 
not significant results. In contrast, Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries show a 
negative, but not significant relationship.  
Table 8: Analysis of the effect of labour taxes on HDI by typologies of social models 
Model (6.1) 
n=249 
Continental Nordic Anglo-Saxon Mediterranean Eastern 
European 
ln (GDP pc) 0.0043087 0.00159750 0.00259301 0.00462594 0.00385813 
Corruption 0.00768564* 0.00323811 0.00799977* 0.00715700 0.00764798* 
LRU -0.000183263* -0.000173327* −0.00018488* −0.000176750 −0.000142166 
Labor  2.05998e-07 2.4356e-0.7*** 2.9296e-07*** 2.55050e-07* 2.5266e-07*** 
Labor * dummy 6.9045e-08*** 7.16698e-
07*** 
−1.7253e-07** −6.121e-08*** 9.46930e-07* 
Table 9: Analysis of the effect of capital taxes on HDI by typologies of social models 
Model (6.2) 
n=238 
Continental Nordic Anglo-Saxon Mediterranean Eastern 
European 
ln (GDP pc) 0.00424276 0.00438435 0.00459649 0.00471586 0.00532267 
Corruption 0.00576311 0.00755019 0.00888319* 0.00860501* 0.00891159** 
LRU −0.00024708* −0.00021657** −0.00021867** −0.00022258** −0.00022714** 
Capital  −4.74749e-08   2.6404e-07** 1.19728e-06 3.70865e-07 2.74466e-07 
Capital * 
dummy 
6.7885e-06*** 2.74469e-05 −1.20743e-06 −6.09239e-07 −0.0001688*** 
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Table 10: Analysis of the effect of consumption taxes on HDI by typologies of social models  
Model (6.3) 
n=249 
Continental Nordic Anglo-Saxon Mediterranean Eastern 
European 
ln (GDP pc) 0.00359396 0.00125965 0.00263414 0.00398649 0.00358358 
Corruption 0.00703376 0.00328048 0.00672984 0.00556840 0.00723269* 
LRU −0.00020111** −0.00019495** −0.00019877** −0.00019766** −0.000128385 
Consumption  2.6779e-07*** 2.7664e-07*** 3.0808e-07*** 2.9691e-07*** 2.8977e-07*** 
Consumption * 
dummy 
1.4479e-08*** 6.3679e-07*** −1.13614e-07 −1.05663e-07 1.0364e-06*** 
 
Table 5 below sums up the results obtained by marking in circle the results that seem to be 
significant., and figures 10-17 provide data by social models on tax structure. In any case, 
these results should be interpreted with caution, since because of a limited number of 
countries in each of the groups the results may not fulfill the assumptions properly. However, 
it is useful to conclude that there may be characteristic factors in each of the groups allowing 
some increase welfare through tax increases, while others may not present significant 
changes.  This could be explained by cultural reasons, efficiency factors in the provision of 
public goods and services, and so on.   
Table 9: Summary table of the effects of increases in labor, capital and consumption taxes on welfare 
(HDI) by types of social models  
 Continental Nordic Anglo-
Saxon 
Mediterrane
an 
Eastern-
European 
Labor taxes + + + - + 
Capital taxes + + - - - 
Consumption taxes + + - - + 
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Figure 14 
 
Figure 15 
 
Figure 16 
 
Figure 17 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This work has contributed to filling the gap in the literature by the analysis of the way taxation 
affects welfare in European countries (2004-2014). Because of increasing needs of analyzing 
the welfare impact of economic and social policies since the rise of the Welfare State, the 
study of the relationship with taxation, as one of the most relevant economic instruments in 
hands of the governments, has gained importance. For that purpose, a panel data model has 
been estimated considering Sheshinkski’s abbreviated welfare function and the Human Development 
Index as welfare proxies. Besides, aiming to obtain a deeper understanding of this 
relationship, the selected countries have been categorized in groups regarding their socio-
economic characteristics: Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean and Eastern 
European countries.  
The most important conclusion extracted is that fiscal pressure increases help European 
countries raise welfare conditions, measured by the Human Development Index, significantly. 
Despite it does not present significant effects when measuring welfare by Sheshinski’s 
abbreviated welfare function, when decomposed, it is observed that higher tax levels reduces 
inequality significantly, though it does not affect income variables in a significative way. 
Therefore, it is concluded that a higher fiscal pressure helps countries improving welfare 
conditions, others than material ones.  
With respect to tax structure, the analysis of the share of labor, capital and consumption 
taxes over total taxes shows that all of them affect significantly the HDI. This way, it is 
observed that labor taxes are the ones affecting the most this welfare proxy, followed by 
capital and consumption taxes, respectively. When measuring this relationship by the 
abbreviated welfare function it is observed that capital taxes are the ones with the largest effect 
on welfare. This, in fact, goes in line with previous literature, which claims that capital taxes 
are the ones affecting the most economic growth (negatively).  
Finally, it has been observed that significant differences within different European social 
models exist. When the effect of tax structure is studied for each of these models, it is 
observed that the effects on welfare (measured by the HDI) even go in different directions 
and significance levels vary. The main implication of these results is that other factors, such 
as efficiency in the administrations and cultural reasons, may affect the relationship found 
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between taxation and welfare. Therefore, particularities in each country or social models 
should be born in mind when policies are to be implemented.  
The study of the relationship between taxation – tax level and tax structure – and welfare 
can be further studied by developing more comprehensive welfare measures, as well as by 
focusing it on the analysis of different countries and periods. In any case, this work has been 
part of a degree final project and it has contributed to developing several competences. 
Section II has managed to familiarize with concepts related to fiscal systems and its 
institutional design. Hence, taxation measurement approximations have been evaluated, both 
by tax level (fiscal pressure) and tax structure (direct vs. indirect taxes, and labor, capital and 
consumption taxes). Besides, this section has helped to better understand all dimensions 
which englobe a core concept in public economics; welfare. The empirical analysis, on the 
other hand, has increase both the knowledge and the practice with econometric tools (panel 
data models, dummy variables, multicollinearity problems, control variables), which were 
unknown previous to this first approach.   
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9 APPENDIX 
Models (1 and 2): Effect of Tax Level and Welfare 
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Models (1A and 1B): Effect of Tax Level on GDPpc and Gini 
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Models (3 and 4): Effect of Tax Structure on Welfare 
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Model 5: Analysis of the Welfare differences between typologies of social models 
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Model 6.1: Analysis of the effect of labour taxes on each type of social model 
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Model 6.2: Analysis of the effect of capital taxes on each type of social model 
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Model 6.3: Analysis of the effect of consumption taxes on each type of social model 
 
